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The Base Money Paradox 
Base money is government-issued money. It 
includes dollars held by the public and finan-
cial institutions as currency and coin, plus 
dollars held by financial institutions as re-
serve deposits with Federal Reserve Banks. 
Base money is the monetary standard in 
which payments, bookkeeping records, and 
debts are denominated. 
But here is the paradox: the more rapidly that 
base money increases in dollar terms, the 
more rapidly it decreases in real terms. Real 
base money (b) is its purchasing power, cal-
culated by multiplying the total number of 
dollars of base money (B) times the purchas-
ing power of each dollar (1 /P), so that b = 
B/P. (P is the GNP deflator, an index of the 
average level of prices for all goods and ser-
vices included in GNP.) I(the price index 
doubles, purchasing power is halved. 
Sources of base money 
Where does base money come from? It is 
created by the monetary authorities-the 
U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. When 
the monetary authorities buy anything at all, 
they pay for it by creating base money: for 
example, Federal-government purchases of 
goods and services, revenue-sharing pay-
ments to state governments, government 
credit extensions, or Federal Reserve pur-
chases of government securities or foreign 
currencies. These payments can be made by 
issuing currency and coin. More typically, 
they are made by issuing checks (drawn on 
Federal Reserve Banks) that the public and 
banks can cash for currency and/or  'credits to 
Reserve Bank deposit accounts. In contrast, 
base money is destroyed whenever the gov-
ernment gets paid for anything: for example, 
tax receipts, loan repayments, or Treasury or 
Federal Reserve sales of securities or foreign 
currencies. Thus base money increases when 
the government pays for anything, and de-
creases when the government is paid for any-
thing. Historically, base money has grown 
most during war periods, because of the 
government's inability to finance substantial 
budget deficits by taxation alone. 
The monetary authorities don't necessarily 
have control over base money in the long 
run -especially if they are obligated to buy 
or sell anything at a fixed dollar price, such as 
gold, foreign currencies, or U.S. Treasury 
securities. Under a fixed exchange-rate 
system, an attempt by the monetary author-
ities to increase'base money excessively 
would induce price, output, and interest-rate 
changes, and those changes would subse-
quently force them to sell gold or foreign 
currencies to prevent the dollar from de-
preciating. Such sales would reduce base 
money, offsetting the attempted increase. 
Thus, base money can't be controlled, at least 
not for long, under fixed exchange rates.  In 
contrast, under flexible exchange rates, the 
monetary authorities are not obi igated to in-
tervene in foreign-exchange markets, so that 
the dollar amount of base money can grow at 
whatever rate they choose. 
Under either fixed or flexible exchange rates, 
the amount of real (price adjusted) base 
money is determined not by the monetary 
authorities but by the public. Even if the 
authorities determine the dollar amount of 
base money, the public determines the price 
level and thereby holdings of real base 
money. And again, when growth in the dollar 
amount of base money speeds up, growth in 
real base money slows down. 
Sources of the paradox 
Hyperinflation, a base-money disease, pro-
vides the best illustration of the paradox. 
Consider the characteristic pathology of this 
disease. Large government deficits are fi-
nanced largely by the issuance of base 
money. In response to the resulting inflation, 
the public in every instance systematically 
economizes on its real base-money holdings. 
This "flight from the currency" means that 
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by bidding up prices even faster than th.e 
authorities inject nominal base money Into 
the economy. By sodoing, the public actually 
adds to the inflationary effect of base-money 
injections. In hyperinflations, such flights 
from the currency eventually destroy base 
money as a functioning monetary standar? 
for transacting, bookkeeping, and denomin-
ating debts. As a consequence, the authorities 
find it necessary to institute monetary 
reforms, including guarantees against further 
inflationary issue of base money, to replace 
the defunct monetary unit with a new one. 
Even in less virulent inflations, the base-
money paradox can sometimes be observed. 
In the United States in the 1970s, for 
example, accelerated injections of nominal 
base money became associated with de-
celerated growth in real base money (see 
Chart 1), and in base money per unit of  output 
(see Chart 2). 
Attempts by the monetary authorities to alle-
viate tight money by buying securities and 
making loans-and thereby pumping base 
money into the economy-have in time the 
exact opposite effect. The reason is that ac-
celerated base-money injections fuel accel-
erated inflation, which raises (rather than 
lowers) nominal interest rates. (How longthis 
takes depends on the credibility of  the author-
ities -that is, whether the authorities can be 
expected subsequently to take offsetting 
actions to prevent inflation.) Higher rates then 
induce the publ ic to reduce real base money, 
leaving a smaller amount available to effect 
transactions. 
Comparative trends 
One can think of real base money as a rough 
measure of the value the public places on its 
use as the monetary standard. Growth in 
nominal base money accelerated in recent 
decades, from a 4.3-percent annual rate in 
the 1960's to a 7.7  -percent rate in the 1970's 
(Chart 1). In contrast, real base money decel-
erated, from a 1.5-percent annual rate in the 
1960's to a 1.0-percent rate in the 1970's. In 
1980, when inflationary expectations were 
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well entrenched, base money in nominal 
terms increased 8.6 percent while real base 
money actually fell 1.0 percent. 
Moreover, base money fell relative to GNP 
throughout the past two decades (Chart 2). In 
1960 base money was over 9 percent of 
GNP. In 1980 it was down to less than 6 
percent of GNP, demonstrating the relation 
between its abundance in nominal terms and 
its scarcity relative to the income-producing 
transactions it supports. 
Waste of inflation 
How valuable is base money to the econ-
omy? The answer becomes obvious when an 
economy breaks down in the final stages of 
hyperinflation. The monetary standard has 
\  real significance. But even in comparatively 
mild inflations, when people come to expect 
inflation and increase their use of real 
resources to economize on base-money 
holdings, consumable real output declines in 
parallel. An inflation-induced reduction in 
real base money raises the real costs of  effect-
ing transactions. This is waste pure and 
simple. It costs virtually nothing for the 
monetary authorities'  to maintain the stock of 
base money. But one cost of  inflation is that it 
costs billions in people's time and materials 
("shoe leather" .costs) to economize base 
money when expected inflation and nominal 
interest rates are high. 
Indirect evidence of  this waste is the plethora 
of branches of financial institutions that 
opened in the 1970's. (In San Francisco, for 
instance, the zoning authority recently pro-
hibited the establishment of any more offices 
of financial institutions in Chinatown 
because of a belief that they were ruining the 
character of  the area.) Nationwide, there 
were about 46,000 offices of  depository i  nsti-
tutions in 1959,69,000 in 1969, and 153,000 
in 1979. In terms of  jobs, banks accounted for 
1.2 percent of nonagricultural employment 
in 1958, 1.3 percent in 1968, and 1.6 percent 
in 1978. 
Whatever the measure-increases in num-
bers of  banking offices and employees orfall-ing growth in real base money-inflation im-
poses substantial waste in the form of under-
utilization of a monetary standard which 
costs virtually nothing to supply, or over-
utilization of costly substitutes. Such waste 
can be reduced either by eliminating inflation 
or by paying a sufficient nominal return on 
base money. Administratively it would be 
feasible for the Federal Reserve to pay interest 
on bank-reserves. Butthis might not do much 
good. Most bank reserves are held to meet 
statutory reserve requ i  rements -and in any 
event constitute only one-fourth of base 
money, in comparison with the three-fourths' 
share in currency and coin held by the public. 
Paying interest on currency and coin could 
be an administrative nightmare. The nominal 
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value of an interest-bearing currency would 
constantly be changing, and this would con-
found its functioning as the monetary 
standard. Furthermore, to collect interest on 
currency, holders would have to turn it in to 
be counted periodically, thereby raising the 
real costs of maintaining base money. Thus, 
eliminating inflation is probably the best 
prescription for curing the base-money 
disease and reducing waste in the money-
payments system. 
William G. Dewald 
(The author, Professor of  Economics at Ohio 
State University, is Visiting Scholar this 
semester at the Federal Reserve Bank of  San 
Francisco.) 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 







































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
9/2/81  8/26/81 
117  - 204 
331  10 
- 215  214 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
11,861  8.5 
12,704  10.8 
5,152  15.0 
6,089  12.7 
674  - 2.8 
359  35.4 
685  10.6 
154  1.0 
4,545  9.4 
3,992  11.9 
363  1.2 
21,954  34.3 
22,176  39.9 
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